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Abstract
Data breaches represent one of the main concerns
for executives across all sectors. Data breaches open a
period of crisis for the affected firm and require them
to disclose complex information to a variety of
stakeholders in a timely and proper manner. This
paper investigates the relationship between social
media disclosure of a data breach and its cost, as
proxied by the response of the affected firm’s stock
price. Using an event study methodology on a sample
of 32 data breaches from 29 US publicly-traded firms
from 2011 to 2014, we find that social media
disclosure exacerbates the negative stock price’s
response to the announcement. However, such a
negative association is contingent on firm’s visibility
on traditional media with social media disclosure
having a beneficial effect for low-visibility companies.

1. Introduction
The amount of data organizations collect, store and
process for their daily activities has grown
exponentially in the last few years [29]. This data
usually contains valuable information that is attractive
to cyber criminals. As such, firms are heavily investing
in ways to protect their information systems (IS) from
cyber attacks [45]. According to Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, 543 million records were lost between
January 2005 and January 2012 as a consequence of
2,800 data breaches [37]. Data breaches are costly
events for the affected firms and estimating such costs
is challenging as they comprise largely implicit costs
e.g. loss in customers’ trust and brand reputation [18,
20]. Empirical researchers attempt to overcome this
issue by adopting stock price reaction as a proxy [18,
20] and show that a breach may cause a loss in firm
value of up to 5.5 percent [7]. Given this significant
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impact, it is not surprising that data breaches are a real
concern for firms, investors and regulators. Regulators
have tried to limit the harm of data breaches for
affected individuals, investors and stakeholders by
enforcing a mandatory and timely disclosure for such
events. However, data breaches generate complex
information and therefore how such information is
disclosed, is important in this context [12, 47].
Historically, firms relied on traditional media (i.e.
the press) to disseminate information [6]. But
traditional media tends to focus on highly visible firms
since they attract larger readership [5]. As a result, low
visibility firms, which represent the largest part of the
market, struggle in reaching a larger set of stakeholders
through traditional media. In this context, the
emergence of social media represented a structural
change in corporate communication, and particularly
for low visibility firms, since it offers firms the
opportunity to communicate more effectively at
relatively low cost.
Previous studies suggest a positive effect of social
media adoption in improving customer engagement
[37], constraining negative outcomes caused by
product recalls [30], detecting customer complaints
regarding product defects [2], increasing equity market
value [42], and lowering information asymmetry [6].
Despite these advantages, some studies advise caution
in how the value of social media is measured since
social media per se cannot generate value without the
implementation of an adequate communication strategy
[25]. In addition to firms, policymakers and regulators
have acknowledged the increasing importance of social
media for corporate information disclosure, and have
recognized it as an official communication channel
[41].
Social media represents a useful communication
channel in the context of a company crisis [30], which
is defined as “a specific, unexpected and non-routine
event or series of events that create high levels of
uncertainty and threaten, or are perceived to threaten,
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an organization’s high priority goals” [40]. Given the
unexpected nature and the extent of the potential
damage, a data breach arguably fits into such a
definition. Social media allows a breached firm to
bypass information intermediaries and easily
disseminate its intended message, potentially lowering
the cost of the breach and exposure to litigation risk
[36]. However, there is also a potential counter effect.
Due to the virality typical of social media platforms, a
company may lose control of the information flow,
thereby in fact worsening an already serious situation
[9, 30]. Understanding social media usage around data
breaches is therefore critical for firms that suffer data
breaches and this study aims to shed light on its
potential contrasting impacts.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that
investigates the impact of data breach disclosure via
social media on stock market reaction. We therefore
provide novel and important insights for management
into communications strategy around data breaches.
Our study also contributes to the literature on the
impact of social media for crisis communication in two
key ways. First, by investigating the role of social
media in the context of data breach disclosure; and
second, by providing unique evidence of a significant
benefit to social media for low visibility firms in
particular, which typically struggle in gaining attention
in traditional media.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section provides a review of the essential
literature while the following section presents our
research hypotheses. We then describe the research
design and the data collection. Finally, we present the
results of the empirical analyses and the robustness
tests, and conclude by discussing the implications of
the study and directions for future research.

2. Background
2.1. Data breaches
A data breach is defined as an incident that
involves unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or
confidential data resulting in the compromise or
potential compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the affected data [22]. The number of IS
breaches is growing every year and the increasing
popularity of cloud computing, mobile devices and big
data exacerbate this issue [1].
Data breaches impose both short and long term
costs on the affected companies. Short-term costs are
due to investigation and remediation activities, legal
advisory, fines, and lost transactions. Long-term costs
are related to loss of present and future revenues as

well as the deterioration of customers’ and partners’
trust [20]. A prominent example of the cost of a data
breach is ChoicePoint. In early 2006, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) imposed a $10 million fine against
ChoicePoint as a consequence of a massive data breach
that involved 160,000 records; the company also
agreed to pay another $5 million to compensate
affected individuals [17]. Research into the economics
of information security provides evidence on both
determinants and deterrents, and consequences of
security breaches. Investments in cyber-security [21],
effective internal controls [9], adequate vendors
policies [21] and external monitoring [39], users’
behaviors [35], and domestic and international law
enforcement [34] proved to constrain the number of
security breaches. From a consequences perspective,
most of the empirical research to date attempts to
estimate the overall cost of breach events by adopting
the change in stock price following the announcement
(i.e. cumulative abnormal returns) as an appropriate
proxy. This assumption is based on the semi-strong
market efficiency hypothesis [15] according to which
the stock price incorporates all public information and
all future expected firm cash flows. However, even
though empirical results, thus far, suggest a negative
impact, evidence on the magnitude is mixed with price
decline values ranging from 0.86 [18] to 5.5 percent
[7]. Gordon et al. [22] argue that such conflicting
results may be due to differences in the sample
composition or in the period of analysis with more
recent data breaches causing a lower negative market
reaction.
A factor that significantly affects the overall costs
of data breaches is the amount of time between the
beginning of the breach activity and its detection as
well as the time between the breach detection and its
disclosure [36]. Furthermore, investigating a data
breach is a complex process and often requires a
significant amount of time and deep technical
capabilities [8]. As a result, details about the incident
may not become apparent or public for some time
resulting in uncertainty during this period. Similarly,
the explanation surrounding the data breach
announcement may be complex. This uncertainty and
complexity is likely to adversely affect the market
reaction [26].

2.2. Social media
Social media represents one of the most
transformative impacts of information technology and
has fundamentally changed the way we communicate,
collaborate, consume, and create content [13]. Social
media research is still at an early stage of
conceptualization and due to the rapid evolution of
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social media platforms, a degree of definitional
ambiguity exists. Lynn et al. [31] suggest that there are
three definitional perspectives – the application view,
the communication view and the integrative view. For
the purposes of this paper, we use the integrative view.
From this perspective, social media is defined as both
the conduits and the content disseminated through
interactions between individuals and organizations
[28]. As such, it includes a set of web-based and
mobile tools and applications that allow users to create
(consume) content that can be consumed (created) by
others and which enables and facilitates connections
[24].
Social media allows firms to overcome one of the
main limitations of traditional media (e.g. newspapers):
limited coverage [10]. Media coverage is often related
to size, with larger firms having higher visibility and
greater access both to media outlets and their audiences
[9]. Network (and audience) accessibility combined
with the ability for users to generate and share content
distinguishes social media and traditional media [30].
Social media allows both large and small firms to
directly engage with end-consumers in an efficient way
[27]. However, social media represents a challenge
from a firm perspective since messages can be
propagated, attenuated, and amplified by users
themselves [3]. This requires a shift in a firms’
communication strategy as well as adequate resources
invested in managing social media [19].
Academic research on the impact of corporate
disclosures via social media on the stock market has
grown in recent years. Many studies focus on Twitter
since it is the most commonly adopted for social
investor communication and company event disclosure
[6, 25]. Compared to other widely adopted social
media platform (e.g. Facebook), Twitter has the
peculiarity of being a largely open network and it also
has the unique feature of ‘retweeting’, which makes it
a powerful mechanism for information sharing [28].
Empirical studies on the impact of Twitter on stock
market suggest that the emotionality [49] and
sentiment [43] of tweets affect stock market returns,
and that additional dissemination of firm-initiated news
via Twitter is associated with lower information
asymmetry [6].
More recently, studies have begun to investigate the
impact of social media around specific scheduled
events such as earnings announcements [25, 44, 47],
while Lee et al. [30] investigate the economic impact
of social media in the context of a company crisis. The
authors adopt product recalls as an example of
company crisis and their findings suggest that the
disclosure of the recall through Twitter mitigates the
negative price reaction when the recalling firm can
control the information flow. Like product recalls, data

breaches represent firm crises, which expose affected
firms to a number of potential negative consequences.
As such, they contrast with many corporate events
where there are varying degrees of expectations and
provide an ideal setting to examine the role of social
media usage as a firm communication channel. Despite
these similarities, product recalls and data breaches
differ in terms of number of occurrences and number
of people affected, with data breaches typically
affecting a larger number of organizations and
individuals than product recalls1. Furthermore, the
increasing complexity and pervasiveness of data
breaches, as well as the lack of a clear guidance for
their disclosure2, make managers consider data
breaches more concerning than product recalls because
of the combination of higher likelihood and potential
damages [36].

3. Hypotheses development
Disseminating information around a breach event
quickly is a requirement under compliance with the
Security Breach Notification Laws (SBNLs). Although
the disclosure of a data breach is mandatory, the
communication of the event on social media is
voluntary. Firms are likely to use voluntary disclosure
to share positive news while they are more reluctant to
voluntarily disclose bad news both on traditional [32]
and social media [14]. Since a data breach is bad news,
and with this bad news being broadcast to a wide
audience using social media, we expect the negative
price reaction to the announcement to be larger if a
firm discloses the event through its social media
account. Our first hypothesis is therefore stated as
follows:
H1: The disclosure of data breaches on social
media increases the negative stock price reaction to
data breach announcements.
As discussed in the previous section, traditional
media accommodates high visibility firms, while low
visibility firms struggle in reaching a large audience
with their company specific news [5]. This may be
particularly detrimental when information has to be
disclosed quickly, as in the case for data breach events.
1

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reports 2,197 data breaches from
2011 to 2014 while the Consumer Product Safety Commission
2
While product recalls in the US have been regulated nation-wide
since 1972 (Consumer Product Safety Act), a unique regulation for
data breach disclosure is still missing. Since 2002, when the first
SBNL was enacted California, 47 states Forty-seven states, the
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have
enacted their own SNBLs [33]. However, SBNLs still significantly
differ from each other creating uncertainty in terms of disclosure
requirements [46].
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The risk is that low visibility firms, though they detect
the breach quickly, cannot disseminate the event
information effectively because they do not command
enough attention in traditional media and, therefore,
face larger relative damage. Social media levels the
playing field somewhat by providing low visibility
firms direct access to a potentially wider audience and
a greater prospect of market attention than would
otherwise be possible [30]. As such, it provides the
affected firm with an opportunity to disclose data
breach event information in a more effective manner.
Given this important innovation provided by social
media, we test whether there is a difference in market
reaction between high and low visibility firms. Our
contention is that, in contrast to high visibility firms,
low visibility firms benefit from having the level of
market attention afforded by its social media presence,
over and above the case of either no traditional media
or very limited traditional media news coverage. For
high visibility firms, a social media presence simply
adds to an already established level of market attention.
We therefore state our second hypothesis as follows:
H2: The disclosure of data breaches on social
media by low visibility firms decreases negative stock
price reaction to data breach announcements.

4. Research methodology
In this study we adopt an event study methodology
based on the efficient market theory which states that
new information in the market will fully reflect in a
firm's stock price [15]. Because the market should not
be capable of anticipating when firms will make a data
breach announcement, it is appropriate to use the event
methodology to catch unexpected business events in
the stock market [11].
The following regression model is used to test our
research hypotheses:
𝐶𝐴𝑅!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡!,! + 𝛼! 𝐿𝑜𝑤!,!
+𝛼! 𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡!,! ×𝐿𝑜𝑤!,!
+𝛼 ! 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!,! + 𝜀!,!

(1)

The dependent variable in Eq. (1) is the cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) over a two- (0;+1) or three-day
(0;+2) period starting on the announcement day
(hereafter, the event period) [18]. We adopt the market
model [14] to estimate daily abnormal returns (ARs)
and then sum up the daily ARs over the event period to
obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which
is proxy for price reaction to the announcement [7, 18].
The market model equation is as follows:
𝑅!,! − 𝑅𝐹! = 𝛼! + 𝛽! (𝑅𝑀! − 𝑅𝐹! ) + 𝜀!,!

(2)

where Ri,t is the stock return for firm i on day t; RFt is
the risk-free interest rate on day t; RMt is the stock
return of market on day t; αi is Jensen’s alpha for firm
i; βi is the Capital Asset Pricing Model’s slope
parameter for firm i (i.e., the systematic risk of the
return of firm i, relative to the return of the entire
market, and often denoted as the beta of the stock); and
εit is the model’s error term.
To capture the effect of a data breach disclosure on
social media on price reaction, we adopt two indicator
variables (i.e. TweetEvent and Low) and the interaction
variable between them. TweetEvent is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a firm disclosed a data breach
through its active Twitter account and 0 otherwise. We
classify the firms in our sample as low visibility (Low)
if the average daily number of newspaper articles
during the estimation period was below the first tercile
threshold. The interaction variable (Twitter x Low)
allows us to explore if there is a difference in the
communication use of Twitter in data breach disclosure
for low visibility firms relative to high visibility firms.
The regression coefficient of TweetEvent tests H1,
while the regression coefficient of the interaction
variable tests H2.
Our models include four categories of control
variables: (a) controls for breach characteristics; (b)
controls for traditional media activity; (c) controls for
social media activity; and (d) controls for firm
characteristics.
The cost of a data breach, and, therefore, the market
reaction to the announcement, depends on the breach
type, the number of records breached, and the
occurrence of previous breaches [5, 6]. Thus, our
model includes seven dummy variables identifying six
different breach types as reported by the Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse3: (a) a payment card fraud
(Card), (b) an unintended information disclosure
(Disc), (c) an attack by a hacker (Hack), (d) an insider
misbehavior (Insd), (e) a lost, discarded or stolen
portable device (Port), and (f) an unknown reason
(Unkn)4; and two dummy variables, RecordsKnown
and PriorBreach, indicating whether a firm disclosed
the exact number of breached records or whether it had
suffered previous breach(es) before respectively.
A control variable for traditional media activity
(ATMedia) was constructed as suggested by Lee et al.
[11].
𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎!,! =

𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎!,! − 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎!,!
𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎!,!

(3)

3

https://www.privacyrights.org/node/1398.
The Privacy Right Clearinghouse classification includes two more
breach categories i.e. physical loss (Phys) and stationary device
(Stat). Since none of the events in our sample fall into these
categories, we do not create any indicator variable for them.
4
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Where TMedia is the average daily number of
newspaper articles during the event period (0;+1) while
NTMedia is the average daily number of newspaper
articles during a 120-day estimation period ending five
days before the event (-125;-6). This variable provides
a measure of the abnormal attention a firm attracts
around a data breach announcement.
Control variables for social media activity include a
variable to control for a firm Twitter activity around
the announcement (ATweet) and a proxy for a firm’s
social media audience (Followers). While Followers is
log-transformed to reduce the variance of the
distribution, ATweet is defined as follows:
𝐴𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡!,! =

𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡!,! − 𝑁𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡!,!
𝑁𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡!,!

(4)

Where Tweet (NTweet) is the average daily number of
tweets generated by the Twitter account of firm i
during the event period (estimation period) for event j.
Finally, include control variables for firms’
characteristics such as (i) size, as proxied by total
assets (Size), the cost of a data breach might be
different for small and large firms [5]; (ii) growth
expectations, as proxied by the market-to-book ratio
(Growth), since firms with higher growth opportunities
might suffer larger negative market reaction [5]; and
(iii) industry-related security expectation (HighExp)
since firms operating in financial services and data
processing are expected to meet high security standards
[18].

5. Sample and data
We build our sample starting from the list of
breaches that occurred from January 2011 to December
2014 as compiled by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse5.
While the number of Twitter users has increased since
2010 [30], the actual number of tweets, which denotes
the real activity, only increased dramatically in 20116.
For this reason we adopt 2011 as the starting year of
our sample.
The initial event list included 2,257 breaches.
Being interested in analyzing the stock price reaction
to the announcement, we deleted all events that
affected non-publicly traded companies (2,034). We
then searched on Lexis-Nexis to determine if any
newspaper reported an event in our sample before the
official announcement date and, if this was the case,
we adjusted the event date to the date of this first
5

http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach. This dataset has been
adopted in other recently published studies (e.g. [38]).
6
According to Twitter statistics, the number of tweets per day was
35 million in 2010, and 200 million in 2011. See
https://blog.twitter.com/2010/measuring-tweets for further details.

newspaper article. This occurred for 14 events. We
also used Lexis-Nexis to check whether any
confounding event or information leakage 7 occurred in
a seven-day period before the announcement of a given
breach. 57 events were excluded on this basis. In case
of multiple events for the same firm, we required the
events to be at least 130 days apart from each other.
This was necessary to avoid any biases in the defined
estimation periods; we excluded 47 events that did not
meet this condition. In order to ensure a sample of
comparable events, we excluded 9 events that were
announced during weekends or public holidays.
We searched for the main Twitter accounts or for
customer services Twitter accounts on the firms’
websites and then used Twitter advanced search to
check whether the firms tweeted about the data
breach8. When a firm had both active main and
customer service Twitter accounts, we considered only
the customer service accounts as this would more
likely be targeted by customers’ complaints. Finally,
given that SBNLs were enacted in different years
across different states, we checked that all firms in our
final sample were subject to mandatory disclosure
when the breach occurred. Finally, we excluded 23
events because of missing values. Our final sample
includes 32 events corresponding to 29 firms9. Table 1
summarizes the sampling process. Table 2 provides
relative frequencies of events over time, while Table 3
reports the number of events per breach type.
For this study we retrieved data from three other
sources. Daily stock price and market index data was
sourced from Thomson Reuters Datastream. To collect
the number of newspaper articles we searched for
company name or ticker symbol in the headlines or the
lead paragraph of newspaper articles using Lexis-Nexis
PowerSearch [30]. The Twitter data came from
TwitterCounter, which provides daily statistics on
active Twitter accounts. TwitterCounter statistics
include the daily number of tweets generated from a
specific account as well as the daily number of
followers and followings.

7

We consider confounding events all earnings announcements,
merger and acquisitions news or rumors, CEO and/or top executive
turnover. We checked for information leakage in both newspaper
articles and in the tweets generated from or mentioning the company
account.
8
We searched whether any tweet was generated from the official
Twitter account containing the following keywords in the event
period ‘breach OR breached OR breaches OR hacker OR hacked OR
attack’. All the tweets retrieved were manually inspected to ensure
that they were related to the announcement of the data breach that
affected the company that generated the message.
9
The limited sample size reflects the data availability and the need to
apply adequate filters in order to reduce possible noise. Both the
sampling criteria and the size of our sample are in line with previous
studies on the same topic e.g. [7, 18, 22, 38].
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Table 1. Sample definition
Filters

No. of Events

Events reported by Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse (2011-2014)
Non-publicly traded firms
Events with possible confounding
announcements
Events overlapping
Announcement during weekends or
public holidays
Missing data
Without Active Twitter account
Final Sample
Number of firms

2,257
(2,034)
(57)
(47)
(9)
(23)
(55)
32
29

more comprehensive text on the firm’s website. An
exemplar case is the tweet posted by The Home Depot
(@HomeDepot) when its payment card system was
breached in 2014 which reports the following: “To
keep customers updated, we’ve posted a message about
news reports of a possible payment data breach
thd.co/update”. Our regression analysis aims to clarify
whether those firms which do not disclose a data
breach on social media choose the right option or not.
Table 4 also reveals that the number of records
breached is disclosed for just 35 percent of the events
in our sample, while almost 44 percent of the events
are preceded by other breaches.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics

Table 2. Events distribution by year
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total

No. of Events
8
9
8
7
32

%
25.00%
28.14%
25.00%
21.86%
100.00%

Table 3. Events distribution by breach type
Type of Breach
Payment card Fraud
Disclosure
Hacker
Insider
Portable device
Unknown
Total

No. of events
2
2
15
7
3
3
32

%
6.25%
6.25%
46.88%
21.88%
9.38%
9.38%
100.00%

6. Findings
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the
variables included in our regression models. We
Winsorized all continuous variables at 1 and 99 percent
to avoid outliers that could alter the results. The
average price drop during the event period (CARs) is
1.4 percent. The average value of ATMedia reveals that
traditional media pays significant attention to data
breaches since the number of newspaper articles
concerning the events in our sample increases, on
average, by 36 percent in the event period. Looking at
social media activity, results show that breached firms
increase their social media communication (i.e.
tweets), on average, by 10 percent, but only 9 percent
of firms with an active Twitter account decide to
disclose the event through their account suggesting
opportunistic behavior in social media communication
[25]. Given the limited number of characters allowed
in a tweet (140) and the complexity of the information
to be disclosed, these tweets tend to not provide details
regarding the incident occurred and to link back to a

Variable
CAR(0,1)
Size
Growth
ATMedia
Low
ATweet
Followers
TweetEvent
RecordsKnown
PriorBreach
HighExp
N

Mean
-0.018
9.978
-0.860
0.362
0.333
0.101
11.703
0.094
0.375
0.438
0.188
32

Table 5 reports the CARs over different time
windows for the full sample (FS), for the subsample of
firms that disclosed a data breach through their social
media account (TD) and the subsample of firms that
did not (NTD). It also reports the p-values of t-test on
the differences between TD and NTD. Although the
focus of this study is on the most immediate impact of
the announcement over the days (0;+1), looking at
different time windows is useful to investigate whether
the announcement generates longer-term effects.
The results in Table 5 show that a data breach has a
negative and significant impact over a three-day period
starting at the announcement day (0;+2), but the largest
Table 5. CARs Analysis
CAR
(0,1)
(0,2)
(0,3)
(0,4)
(0,5)
(0,1)
(0,2)
(0,3)
(0,4)
(0,5)

FS
-0.016
-0.010
0.007
-0.002
0.015
TD
-0.037
-0.028
0.001
-0.022
-0.009

NTD
-0.014
-0.008
0.008
0.000
0.018

P-Value
0.001***
0.046**
0.283
0.819
0.081*
P-Value
0.048**
0.090*
0.736
0.472
0.329

Page 4777

price drop occurs over the first two days (0;+1). Firms
disclosing a data breach on Twitter face larger negative
returns over the first three days from the announcement
(0;+2) while there is no significant difference
thereafter10. Overall, the results of our univariate
analysis suggest that a data breach announcement
triggers a short-term negative stock price reaction,
which is larger when the event the firms discloses the
event on Twitter. However, the market seems to absorb
the shock relatively quickly with stock price reaching a
new equilibrium after for days from the announcement
(0;+3).
A correlation analysis was also performed in order
to verify whether some of the variables included in our
regression model have a strong correlation. None of the
coefficients denote a strong correlation excluding
potential bias in the regression results due to
multicollinearity [23].
Table 6 presents the results of our regression
analysis. The regression coefficients show that the
disclosure of a data breach on social media
(TweetEvent) exacerbates the negative price response
to the announcement. In particular, the price drops by
5.2 and 3.4 percent more compared to other companies
that have an active Twitter account but do not disclose
the event directly from their account over a two- and
three-day period respectively. This leads us to accept
H1 and suggests that spreading bad news to a larger
audience does not represent a convenient
communications strategy. However, it seems to be an
effective strategy for low visibility firms. The
coefficient of the interaction variable (TweetEvent x
Low), indeed, shows that the event disclosure through
the Twitter account of a low-visibility firm mitigates
the negative price response by 4.4 percent. This result
leads us to accept H2. However, this effect is
significant only when the dependent variable is
CAR(0,1) suggesting that Twitter disclosure of a data
breach accelerates the movement towards a new price
equilibrium for low visibility firms.
Four other factors have a significant effect on the
most immediate price response to the announcement
for firms included in this subsample. Firstly, the
abnormal Twitter communication of a breached firm
(ATweet) increases the negative price reaction, on
average, by 10 percent. This result is a clear signal that
firms tend not to adopt effective communication
strategies in their social media usage and/or that they
cannot keep (enough) control of the information flow.
In other words, the virality of social media overwhelms
firms’ communication skills. Secondly, the larger the
audience (i.e. followers), the more negative the price
10

We compared the CARs up to ten days after the announcement
date with similar results.

response to announcement, as evidenced by the
negative coefficient of Followers. In particular, the
result indicates that stock prices decrease, on average,
by 0.53 percent for every 100 followers. Thirdly,
breaches caused by payment card frauds (Card) have a
more negative price response. The coefficient shows
that this type of breach leads, on average, to a 5 percent
more negative response compared to the case in which
the cause of the breach is unknown. This result is
coherent with previous studies showing that data
breaches involving confidential data trigger a more
negative price reaction. Fourthly, abnormal traditional
media activity (ATMedia) slightly mitigates (0.02
percent) the negative price reaction to the
announcement. A possible interpretation of this result
is that newspaper articles help firms to provide more
details about the event and potentially soften
stakeholder negative perceptions. Among the control
varibales, only ATweet, ATMedia, and Growth have a
significant impact on the three-day CARs (0;+2).

7. Robustness test
The dependent variable of our regression model is
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). As shown
above, we estimate CARs based on the Market Model
[14]. Fama and French [16] propose an alternative
model to estimate CARs. Their model, known as the
Three-factor Model, takes into account two factors
other than the market index return which are the
difference of returns between (a) firms with small and
large market capitalization and (b) firms with high and
Table 6. Regression results
Variable
Intercept
TweetEvent
TweetEvent x Low
ATweet
Followers
Card
Disc
Hack
Insd
Port
RecordsKnown
PriorBreach
ATMedia
Size
Growth
HighExp
Year Fixed-Effects
R-squared
F-Stat
p-Value
N

CAR(0;+1)
0.068**
-0.052***
0.044***
-0.132**
-0.006***
-0.042***
0.022*
0.015*
0.018*
-0.013
0.006
-0.007
0.000***
0.001
0.000**
0.025
Yes
0.82
26.41
0.000
32

CAR(0;+2)
-0.030
-0.034**
0.011
-0.131*
-0.004
-0.006
0.030
0.008
0.019
-0.030
0.013
-0.016
0.000***
0.001
0.001***
0.023
Yes
0.81
23.07
0.000
32

Page 4778

low book-to-market ratio.
In order to ensure that the results of our analysis do
not depend on the estimation model adopted, we
estimate CARs using the Three-factor Model and run
the regression using the new CARs as dependent
variable. The results of our test (untabulated) show
that, except for some minor changes in the value of the
OLS coefficients, all our main findings are confirmed;
therefore we can conclude that the results of this study
are robust to the CAR estimation model specification.
Finally, to ensure that our findings on low visibility
firms are not driven by the threshold adopted, we
repeat the analysis adopting a quartile-based
classification. In this case, low visibility firms are the
ones with an average daily number of newspaper
articles during the estimation period below the first
quartile threshold. Our results (untabulated) are
unaltered; therefore we can conclude that the results of
this study are robust to different visibility classification
criteria.

7. Conclusion
This paper investigates whether communication via
social media affects the price reaction to a data breach
announcement. Using a sample of 32 data breaches that
occurred between January 2011 and December 2014 to
U.S. publicly-traded firms with an active Twitter
account, the study demonstrates that disclosing a data
breach on social media tends to exacerbate the negative
impact of the announcement on stock price, causing an
average additional decrease of 5.2 and 3.4 percent over
a two- (0;+1) and three-day (0;+2) event period
respectively. Further analyses suggest that the negative
effect of social media is even more pronounced when
firms disclose the event through their Twitter account
(-5.2 percent), when they increase the communication
via social media (i.e. number of tweets) in the event
period, and have a larger audience on social media (i.e.
followers). However, our results also suggest that the
impact of social media impact is positive for lowvisibility firms. Specifically, social media disclosure of
a data breach by a low-visibility firm mitigates the
negative price response by 4.4 percent, and it
accelerates the movement towards a new price
equilibrium.
The contribution of this study is threefold. Firstly,
the study provides new insights into the cost of data
breaches by adding the disclosure via social media as a
new significant factor affecting the price reaction to a
data breach announcement. In doing so, we provide
additional evidence on the effectiveness of the use of
social media for crisis communication. In addition, we
contribute to the ongoing debate on the net effect that

social media generates in crisis communication by
providing evidence of a differential impact based on
firms’ visibility on traditional media. This represents
an important contribution to and extension of both the
literature on crisis communication and that on the
impact of firm level social media usage. Social media
usage in firm communication is now commonplace,
however as yet the academic literature provides little
guidance on the impact of this communication strategy
in the context of a company crisis. Our study provides
evidence and important practical information for firms
making communication decisions in crises such as
these. Although there is a generalized positive view on
the adoption of social media in firm communications,
managers should also be aware of the challenges that it
generates, and of the peculiarity of the crisis they are
dealing with. This is particularly true when dealing
with negative and complex information that might
damage the reputation of the company. Managers need
to carefully assess the risk of losing control of the
information flow due to the virality of social media and
to design appropriate communication strategies.
Secondly, our paper provides further evidence of a
negative price reaction to data breach announcements
contributing to the debate about the magnitude of the
economic impact of data breaches and showing
additional potential outcomes related to the way the
information is delivered to the stakeholders. We also
provide further evidence of investors including the
possibility of recurring breaches in their expectations
and penalizing firms affected by breaches involving
confidential data (i.e. credit cards).
Thirdly, our study contributes to the research on the
impact of company disclosure through social media on
stock market by confirming that it significantly affects
the stock price and providing evidence of a positive
impact on low visibility firms in regard of data breach
announcements. By showing that social media usage is
likely to either help or hinder a firm in the context of a
crisis, these results are likely to be useful for industry
as they highlight the need for a contingent crisis
communication strategy based on firm visibility and on
the type of crisis a firm is facing.

7. Limitations and future research
This study is also subject to some limitations that
might represent avenues for future research. Firstly,
our analysis considers only Twitter as a social media
platform. Although Twitter is the most accepted
platform in the financial community, alternative social
media platforms (e.g. Facebook) are available to firms
or indeed firms may decide to disclose events through
a number of platforms at the same time to reach
different stakeholders. The use of alternative platforms,
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potential interconnections between them, and
stakeholders’ preferences are not considered in this
study, therefore further research on this would be
informative. Secondly, our analysis is based on daily
statistics about the use of social media. It does not
allow us to investigate the content of the messages
which might convey more information about the firms’
communication strategies. Breached firms might
provide updates on the incidents or just reply to
customers’ or investors’ enquiries, but they might also
attempt to divert followers’ attention away from the
bad news by issuing other positive announcements.
Further research in this field would shed additional
light on firms’ communication strategy around data
breach announcements and bad news disclosure in
general.
Finally, we do not consider whether breached firms
issue press releases on the announcement day or in the
following day. Press releases arguably provide more
information than a Tweet, which is limited to 140
characters. As such, press releases might reduce
uncertainty and therefore affect the overall cost of the
incident. Given the current lack of specific disclosure
requirements for data breach disclosure, investigate the
information included in disclosure statements to
investigate how breached firms communicate the
incident and whether providing specific type of
information affect the market response to the
announcements.
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